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Abstract
Schneider’s work on rank functions [14] provides a for-
mal approach to verification of certain properties of a se-
curity protocol. However, he illustrates the approach only
with a protocol running on a small network; and no help is
given with the somewhat hit-and-miss process of finding the
rank function which underpins the central theorem.
In this paper, we develop the theory to allow for an ar-
bitrarily large network, and give a clearly defined decision
procedure by which one may either construct a rank func-
tion, proving correctness of the protocol, or show that no
rank function exists.
We discuss the implications of the absence of a rank
function, and the open question of completeness of the rank
function theorem.
1 Introduction
Security protocols can be insecure even under the as-
sumption of perfect cryptographic mechanisms, because
of the possibility of unexpected interactions between the
agents involved and potentially hostile intruders. For-
mal approaches to verification of such protocols have fo-
cused either on attempting to find attacks, or else on di-
rect proofs that attacks cannot occur. Attack-oriented ap-
proaches model protocols and intruder capabilities in terms
of rules which transform messages, and analyse a system
for possible attacks through a combination of algebraic re-
ductions on messages and model-checking for reachability
(see [5, 8, 9, 6] among others.) To keep the state space
manageable, these approaches generally require analysis of
a restricted model of the system, together with some justifi-
cation for generalising the results to larger communication
networks.
The complementary approach attempts to verify proto-
cols directly, rather than in terms of the absence of attacks.
BAN logics [1] provide one such approach, in which proto-
cols are ‘idealised’ into statements within the logic. Al-
ternatively, protocols might be modelled within a formal
framework and then properties proven directly within that
framework [11, 18, 16, 14]. Theorem proving approaches
tend to be more time-consuming in establishing correctness,
though there are techniques for automating aspects of the
analysis, based on the formal models.
The approach taken in [14] is to use the process alge-
bra Communicating Sequential Processes (CSP) to model
protocols in a hostile environment, and to express security
properties as specifications on CSP processes. Verification
proceeds by the discovery of a rank function, a function that
assigns a value to all possible messages within the system,
which is essentially used as an invariant on the messages
that can circulate. However, in practice the construction of
a rank function with all the required properties is intricate
and difficult to do by hand. This paper presents a decision
procedure which either permits the automatic construction
of a rank function, or demonstrates that no rank function
exists.
The structure of the paper is as follows: Section 2.1 in-
troduces the existing approach to using rank functions with
CSP for protocol analysis; Section 3 presents the main re-
sults of the paper, which are concerned with handling the
unbounded nature of the network by identifying a finite
number of equivalence classes, and then with providing a
procedure for constructing a rank function if one exists.
Section 4 discusses the issue of completeness of the rank
function approach, a question which remains open in the
general case of a large network. The paper finishes with
some concluding remarks.
2 Protocol analysis in CSP
In this section, we give an introduction to rank functions,
and a brief overview of how the theory presented in [14]
may be used to verify an authentication protocol.
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CSP notation will be explained as it is introduced. For a
more detailed introduction to CSP, the reader is advised to
consult [4, 12, 15].
2.1 The network
The network considered in [14] consists of two honest
agents A and B and one dishonest enemy. The behaviours of
agents A and B are described as CSP processes USERA and
USERB respectively. These user processes will vary ac-
cording to the protocol under consideration; they will con-
sist of communication along channels trans, representing
transmission of a message, and rec, representing reception.
An example is given in Section 2.5.
We will write U for the set of user identities on the net-
work, and N for the set of nonces that can be used in pro-
tocol runs.
The enemy is described by a CSP process which effec-
tively operates as a communications centre for the entire
network, in the style of the Dolev-Yao model [2]. All users
communicate via the enemy, who may
 pass messages on normally (but take note of the con-
tents of the message in the process);
 intercept messages and fail to deliver them;
 construct and deliver spurious messages purporting to
come from anyone he pleases.
In this last case, he may send any message which he has
already seen in the network or which he can produce us-
ing only messages which he has seen. For instance, if he
has observed NA and NB as separate messages, then he may
construct NA:NA from them and deliver this concatenation.
(This concatenation operator is defined to be associative.)
We define a “generates” relation `, writing S ` m to denote
that the enemy may construct message m if he possesses ev-
ery message in the set S. If m and n are messages, k is a key,
and k 1 is the inverse of k, then ` is the smallest relation
which satisfies
fm; ng ` m:n
fm:ng ` m
fm:ng ` n
fm; kg ` fmgk
ffmgk; k 1g ` m
and also satisfies the closure conditions
m 2 S ) S ` m
S  T ^ T ` m ) S ` m
(8 v 2 T  S ` v) ^ T ` m ) S ` m
The enemy (already in possession of a set of messages S) is
then described by the recursive definition:
ENEMY(S) = trans?i?j?m ! ENEMY(S [ fmg)
2
2
i;j;S`m
rec!i!j!m ! ENEMY(S)
Here the enemy can either receive any message m transmit-
ted by any agent i to any other agent j along a trans channel,
and then act as the enemy with that additional message; or
it can pass any message m that it can generate from S to
any agent i along its rec channel, remaining with the same
information S.
The whole network is then
NET = (USERa jjj USERb) k ENEMY
where jjj represents independent concurrent execution, and
k represents synchronised communication. It can also have
an explicit interface: k
R
requires synchronisation of its argu-
ments on the set R.
For any given protocol, there will be a (possibly infinite)
set of all atoms which could ever appear in a message of
the protocol. This set will encompass all the user identities,
nonces and keys, and any other types of atom used in the
protocol (for instance, timestamps). From this set we can
construct the message space, usually denoted by M, which
is the space of all messages which can be generated from
these atoms.
We use INIT to denote the set of atoms known to the
enemy right from the start. Some users will be under the
control of the enemy, and hence their secret keys and all
nonces that they might produce will be in INIT; other users
will be free of enemy control, and so their secret keys and
nonces will not be in INIT.
2.2 Authentication
For an authentication protocol to be correct, we usually
require that a user B should not finish running the protocol
believing that he has been running with a user A unless A
also believes that he has been running the protocol with B.
(For a discussion of different forms of authentication, see
[14].) Conditions such as this can easily be expressed as
trace specifications on NET, requiring that no event from
a set T has occurred unless another event from a set R has
previously occurred. A trace of a process is a record of the
sequence of events it performs during an execution. Then
P sat S if all of the traces associated with P satisfy the
predicate S.
Definition 2.2.1. For sets R; T 2 M, we define the trace
specification R precedes T as
P sat R precedes T ,
8 tr 2 traces(P)  (tr  R 6= hi ) tr  T 6= hi)
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and note that, since all processes are prefix-closed, this
guarantees that any occurrence of t 2 T in a trace will be
preceded by an occurrence of some r 2 R.
2.3 Rank functions
Definition 2.3.1. A rank function, as defined in [14], is a
function
 :M! Z
from this message space to the set of integers. In addition,
we define
M

 
= fm 2M  (m)  0g
M

+
= fm 2M  (m) > 0g
If a rank function is understood, we will just write M
 
or M
+
. In addition, we will lift  to events concerned with
the communication of messages along channels in the obvi-
ous way: (c:m) = (m).
The point of a rank function will be to partition the mes-
sage space into those messages that the enemy might be able
to get hold of, and those messages that will certainly remain
out of his grasp. Anything with positive rank will be some-
thing that the enemy might get his hands on; anything of
non-positive rank will be unavailable to him.
Our approach will be to construct our message space so
that authentication will correspond to certain messages be-
ing kept secret from the enemy. We will be looking to find
a rank function which correctly assigns a positive rank to
everything that the enemy may acquire, but which still man-
ages to give a non-positive rank to the messages correspond-
ing to our notion of authentication.
In addition, we will have cause to ensure that our rank
function allows for any sleight of hand which the enemy
may wish to perform. This, in particular, means that we
must assign positive rank to anything that the enemy:
 can construct from what he already has;
 can persuade an agent to transmit on the network by
feeding him with messages already in his possession;
 has in his possession from the start.
2.4 The central theorem from [14]
For a process P to maintain the rank with respect to a
rank function , we mean that it will never transmit any
message m with (m)  0 unless it has previously received
a message m0 with (m0)  0. Essentially, this means that
the process will never give out anything secret unless it has
already received a secret message.
Definition 2.4.1. We say that P sat maintains  if
P sat rec:U :U :M

  precedes trans:U :U :M

 
“Theorem 3.5” from [14]. If, for sets R and T, there is a
rank function  :M! Z satisfying
 8m 2 INIT  (m) > 0
 8 S M;m 2 M 
((8m0 2 S  (m0) > 0) ^ S ` m)) (m) > 0
 8 t 2 T  (t)  0
 8 J  USERj k
R
STOP sat maintains 
then NET sat R precedes T.
The proof is omitted; the interested reader is advised to
consult [14].
2.5 Example
Consider the three message version of Lowe’s fixed ver-
sion [6] of the Needham-Schroeder Public-Key Protocol
[10]:
Message 1: A ! B : fA;NAgpkb
Message 2: B ! A : fNA;NB;Bgpka
Message 3: A ! B : fNBgpkb
In order to verify that the protocol correctly authenticates
the initiator on a small network with two honest agents A
and B, we wish to ensure B can never receive Message 3 of
the protocol from A unless A has started the protocol with B.
We define
USERA = trans:A!i!fA;NAgpki
! rec:A:i?fNA; x; igpka
! trans:A!i!fxgpki
USERB = rec:B:A?fA; ygpkb
! trans:B:A!fy;NB;Bgpka
! rec:B:A:fygpkb
and set
R = ftrans:A:B:fA;NAgpkbg
T = frec:B:A:fNBgpkbg
A suitable rank function for this protocol on this network
is given below.
(U) = 1
(N) =
(
1 N 6= NB
0 N = NB
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(pku) = 1
(sku) =
(
0 U = A or B
1 otherwise
(fmgpku) =
(
1 U = A;m 2 N :NB:B
(m) otherwise
(fmgsku) =
(
0 U = A;m 2 fN :NB:Bgpka
(m) otherwise
(m
1
:m
2
) = minf(m
1
); (m
2
)g
A proof that this rank function satisfies the required condi-
tions is given in [14].
The rank functions theorem now assures us that we
have NET sat R precedes T; that is, that B cannot fin-
ish the protocol believing that he is communicating with A
unless A starts the protocol with B.
3 Developments
3.1 Restricting the rank function to f0; 1g
As can be seen from the statement of the theorem, the
rank function is in fact only used to partition the message
space. The actual value of (m) for any given m will not be
of interest—we will only care whether (m) > 0 or (m) 
0.
Because of this, we can redefine rank functions as
 :M! f0; 1g
restricting the range to just two values. This does not affect
the validity of the rank function theorem. For if there is a
function  : M ! Z which satisfies the conditions of the
theorem, then the function 
0
:M! f0; 1g defined as

0
(m) = 0 whenever (m)  0

0
(m) = 1 whenever (m) > 0
must also meet the requirements. And if there is no func-
tion  :M! Zwhich fits the conditions then clearly there
can be no  :M! f0; 1g which works. The theorem then
becomes:
“Theorem 3.5” revised. If there is a rank function  :
M! f0; 1g satisfying
 8m 2 INIT  (m) = 1
 8 S M;m 2M 
((8m0 2 S  (m0) = 1) ^ S ` m)) (m) = 1
 8 t 2 T  (t) = 0
 8 J  USERj k
R
STOP sat maintains 
then NET sat R precedes T.
Thus existence of a rank function on f0; 1g is a neces-
sary and sufficient condition for existence of a rank function
on Z. We may concentrate only on binary rank functions,
assured that establishing existence or otherwise with this re-
stricted codomain will carry over to Z.
3.2 Multiple concurrent runs
So far, the theory can only prove that a small system run-
ning the protocol is secure. Although the intruder is fully
general and can perform any sequence of actions that he
could ever wish to perform, the other players are too re-
stricted. A may only engage in one run of the protocol, and
that as initiator; B, similarly, is allowed only one run, and
this must be as responder, with A as initiator. No other user
ever takes part in a protocol run (though the enemy can sim-
ulate such runs associated with other user names).
It is not inconceivable that there should be attacks which
rely on there being more than two honest agents present, or
on one or more agents engaging in more than one run of the
protocol. These runs will not necessarily follow on one after
the other; they may be run concurrently. We must, therefore,
refine our model to allow for an arbitrary number of users
each taking part in an arbitrary number of concurrent runs of
the protocol, as initiator or responder, and communicating
with any other agents they may choose.
All we insist on is that the honest agents must act in ac-
cordance with the rules of the protocol. Anything which
constitutes a valid attempt to run the protocol as the de-
signer intended will be allowed; but even in our fully gen-
eral model, only the intruder will be allowed complete free-
dom of expression.
Our formal assumptions about protocols covered by this
paper are listed below.
Assumption 3.2.1. The operation of the protocol is indepen-
dent of the identities of the agents involved.
Assumption 3.2.2. The sequence of messages passed in a
protocol run is determined entirely by the identities of the
agents involved and the choices of nonces that the agents
make.
Assumption 3.2.3. The protocol is intended to involve only
two agents—the initiator and the responder—and possibly
a trusted server.
3.2.1 The old model
In the model presented in [14], the two agents A and B (and
possibly a server S) run together in parallel with the enemy.
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The users’ (and server’s) alphabets are pairwise disjoint, so
they are in fact interleaved; and then this large process is
joined in parallel with the enemy:
NET = (USERA jjj USERB jjj S) k ENEMY
3.2.2 The new players
Let us suppose that we have an infinite1 set U of all users,
and that for each user U 2 U we have an infinite set of
nonces N IU which U may use when acting as initiator (but
he will choose each nonce at most once); and an infinite set
of nonces N RU which he will use (again, at most once each)
when playing responder. All these nonce sets are disjoint.
(Depending on which protocol we are considering, we
may find that an agent does not need to choose a nonce
when acting as initiator, or possibly when acting as respon-
der. This will not affect the analysis:N I orN R will be used
in this case as an indexing set to produce an infinite inter-
leaving of identical components. If a protocol requires the
initiator or the responder to choose more than one nonce,
then the model will have to be altered; but the alterations
will be trivial and will not affect the essence of the discus-
sion that follows.)
How will a general user U act? He may act as many
times as he wishes—once for each nonce in N IU—as initia-
tor, each time communicating with an user of his choice;
and, concurrently, as many times as he wishes—once for
each nonce in N RU —as responder, each time communicat-
ing with any user who chooses to contact him. So, assuming
we have a process UIJ(n) which describes a general user U
acting as initiator, communicating with user J and using
nonce n, and similarly for URJ (n), we will find that
U =

jjj
n2N IU
2
J2U
UIJ(n)

jjj

jjj
n2N RU
2
J2U
URJ (n)

As we will see, although we specifically look for a secure
run in the case that A initiates a run with B, the behaviours
of A and B are no different from the behaviour of the other
agents: the above description covers A and B. Thus, our
entire network of users will be simply
U =
jjj
U2U
 

jjj
n2N IU
2
J2U
UIJ(n)

jjj

jjj
n2N RU
2
J2U
URJ (n)

!
3.2.3 The new server
The server may possibly want an infinite set NS of nonces
to play with. Again, providing such a set cannot cause any
1Since we are working in the finite traces model, all our infinite sets
will be countable.
problem: we shall in any case need an infinite set for the
indexed parallel operator so as to ensure that we allow for
arbitrarily many server operations. (We could, if no nonces
are needed, use Z; butNS will work just as well.) We there-
fore define
S=
jjj
n2NS
S(n)
where S(n) is the old (single-run) server process, using
nonce n (if appropriate).
3.2.4 The new network
Our new network is, therefore,
NET = (U jjj S) k ENEMY
3.2.5 Analysing the new network
But how are we to analyse this large network? How
can we hope to find a rank function , and then show
that NET sat maintains (tr)?
Let us consider the case of the following protocol (sug-
gested by Peter Ryan):
Message 1: A ! B : A
Message 2: B ! S : fA;NBgKsb
Message 3: S ! A : fNB;BgKsa
Message 4: A ! B : NB
In this protocol, each key Ksu is a symmetric key shared
between the server and user U. Only the agent acting as
responder needs to choose a nonce, and we are hoping to
authenticate the initiator. (The analysis would not be more
difficult if the initiator also chose a nonce, but it would be
longer and somewhat repetitive.) Since all the users are
identical, we can simply check for correct authentication
in a particular run of the protocol involving A and B, and
a particular nonce NB 2 N RB . If authentication cannot be
faked in this run, then (since this run is arbitrarily chosen)
it cannot be faked in any run.
We are therefore required to check that NET sat
R precedes T for suitable R and T. We want to know that
if B completes the protocol as responder using nonce NB
then A really did attempt to initiate the protocol with B.
Thus, following [14], we might set
R = ftrans:A:B:Ag
and
T = frec:B:A:N
B
g
so that B cannot receive the appropriate fourth message of
the protocol unless A has sent out the first message. How-
ever, we take this opportunity to improve on the model
somewhat. To make the coding less protocol-specific (and
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hence easier to modify for analysing other protocols), we
introduce pseudo-messages initgoU;J at the start of the pro-
tocol and respdoneJ;U;NJ at the end. The former will be sent
to indicate that user U has attempted to initiate a protocol
run with J; and the latter to inform us that J has success-
fully completed the protocol as responder, using nonce NJ ,
and (as far as he is aware) with U as initiator—and it will
be noted that the form of these messages will not need to
change if the protocol changes. Now, as long as we ensure
that our initiator process UIJ starts with an appropriate initgo
and that our responder process URJ (n) finishes with a correct
respdone, we can set
R = ftrans:A:B:initgo
A;B
g
and
T = ftrans:B:A:respdone
B;A;N
B
g
We will, of course, need to augment the message space M
to include all these pseudo-messages. In addition, the
enemy must never be allowed to generate this pseudo-
message—but this is automatic, since for every message m
in T we have (m) = 0.
The appropriate method is not to rush straight in looking
for a rank function. We can drastically reduce the size of
the components on which we need to find a rank function
by some careful CSP manipulation. We first note that if we
define
I=
jjj
U2U
0
@
jjj
n2N IU
2
J2U
UIJ(n)
1
A
and
R =
jjj
U2U
0
@
jjj
n2N RU
2
J2U
URJ (n)
1
A
then clearly
U = I jjj R
Furthermore, we can separate BR from the others by defin-
ing
R
0
=
jjj
U2UnfBg
0
@
jjj
n2N RU
2
J2U
URJ (n)
1
A
so that
U = I jjj R
0
jjj
0
@
jjj
n2N RB
2
J2U
BRJ (n)
1
A
Finally, we split off the case where B responds using nonce
NB by writing
BR
0
=
jjj
n2N RB nfNBg
2
J2U
BRJ (n)
so that we have
U = I jjj R
0
jjj BR
0
jjj
 
2
J2U
BRJ (NB)
!
Now, since we are working exclusively in the traces model,
choice distributes over interleaving. We can move this final
choice outside everything else, to get
U =
2
J2U

I jjj R
0
jjj BR
0
jjj BRJ (NB)

It is a general law of CSP that
2
i2A
Pi sat W(tr) iff 8 i 2 A  Pi sat W(tr)
—or, in other words, a choice satisfies a trace predicate if
and only if each branch of the choice satisfies the predicate.
So we need to show that
8 J 2 U 

I jjj R
0
jjj BR
0
jjj BRJ (NB)

sat R precedes T
If J 6= A then the above holds trivially. B never com-
municates with A using NB, so will never engage in the
event trans:B:A:respdone:B:A:N
B
, making the predi-
cate vacuously true. We need only check, therefore, that

I jjj R
0
jjj BR
0
jjj BRA(NB)

sat R precedes T
Here we use rank functions. We need to find a rank func-
tion  such that

I jjj R
0
jjj BR
0
jjj BRA(NB)

sat maintains (tr)
in order to show that the protocol is properly secure. We
start by noting that if
8 i 2 A  Pi sat maintains (tr)
then
jjj
i2A
Pi sat maintains (tr)
For if the whole interleaving does not maintain the rank, it
must be sending out something of rank zero without having
accepted anything of rank zero. This must be because some
component Pj of the interleaving has sent out something of
rank zero; and if the entire interleaving has not taken in any-
thing of rank zero, then nor has Pj; and so Pj does not main-
tain the rank either. Thus, we can unpack the interleaved
components and check that they individually maintain the
rank. We check that
 I
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 R
0
 BR
0
 BRA(NB)
all maintain the rank. But these first three are all interleav-
ings which can be further split; so, in fact, we need only
check that the following processes maintain the rank:
 UIJ(n) for arbitrary U 2 U ; J 2 U ; n 2 N IU
 URJ (n) for arbitrary U 2 U n fBg; J 2 U ; n 2 N RU
 BRJ (n) for arbitrary J 2 U ; n 2 N RB n fNBg
 BRA(NB)
If these checks all succeed, then we will have proved that
the protocol satisfies initiator authentication even when
multiple concurrent runs are allowed.
It should be noted exactly what we have achieved here.
We have reduced the somewhat tricky problem of verifying
a protocol running on an arbitrarily large network with mul-
tiple concurrent runs to the problem of verifying the pro-
tocol on a system with only a small number of runs. For
to find a rank function suitable to prove correctness on the
unbounded network, we now need to find a rank function
only for the network where each of the four processes listed
above engages in at most one run. This is a significant re-
duction; but we still, so far, have an arbitrary number of
users and nonces to deal with.
For consideration of Ryan’s Protocol, these smaller pro-
cesses are defined as follows:
UIJ(n) = trans:U:J:initgoU;J
! trans:U:J:U
! rec:S:U:fN; Jg
Ksu
! trans:U:J:N
! STOP
URJ (n) = rec:U:J:J
! trans:U:S:fJ; ng
Ksu
! rec:U:J:n
! trans:U:J:respdone
U;J;n
! STOP
BRJ (n) = rec:B:J:J
! trans:B:S:fJ; ng
Ksb
! rec:B:J:n
! trans:B:J:respdone
B;J;n
! STOP
BRA(NB) = rec:A:B:A
! trans:B:S:fA;N
B
g
Ksb
! rec:B:A:N
B
! trans:B:A:respdone
B;A;N
B
! STOP
3.3 The minimal 1-set rank function 
0
We have not yet tackled the issue of exactly how to find a
rank function when we have decided on the message space
and user processes. We need to partition the message space
somehow; but since we are looking for a rank function
rather than the rank function, we have some latitude in how
to proceed with the search. One might be forgiven for think-
ing that this looks like more of an art than a science!
In addition, a fruitless trial-and-error search for a rank
function can never provide convincing evidence that no rank
function exists. We might form a strong suspicion that there
is none to be found, but no more.
Let us define the function 
0
(informally at first) to be
the function which gives a rank of one to everything which
must have rank one, and zero to everything else. For we
recall that to be a suitable rank function we require that
 anything generable from messages of rank one should
also have rank one;
 the user (and server) processes should not transmit
messages of rank zero unless they have received a mes-
sage of rank zero;
 everything in the enemy’s initial knowledge should
have rank one;
 anything in T should have rank zero.
The first three conditions provide us with everything that
must have rank one: if a message is in the enemy’s ini-
tial knowledge, or is generable from other messages of rank
one, or can be given out by a user or server process that
has received only messages of rank one, then that message
must itself have rank one. Otherwise, it may have rank zero
without risk of causing the function to fail on any of these
three conditions. The fourth condition then becomes the
crucial one: do the first three statements force the messages
in T to have rank one? If not, then 
0
is a rank function.
If 
0
(t) = 1 for some t 2 T, however, then we can be cer-
tain that there is no rank function; for 
0
only gives a rank
of one where absolutely necessary.
More formally: we write S ! m if there is a process
controlling one of the users, or the server, in the CSP de-
scription of the protocol which can transmit message m hav-
ing taken inputs only from the message set S, and S  m
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if S ` m or S ! m. (If fm
0
g  m then we may write the
more convenient m
0
 m, omitting the braces.) We further
define
S0 = S [ fm j S mg
Then we let
X
0
= INIT
Xn+1 = Xn0
and write
X =
1
[
i=0
Xi
Then 
0
is the characteristic function of the set X.
If there exists a rank function, then 
0
will be a rank
function. Conversely, if 
0
is not a rank function (and the
only point at which it may fail is by assigning rank one to
some of T) then no rank function exists.
3.4 Reducing the size of M
This will not yet be practical for finding and verifying a
rank function by hand, or even mechanically. For in order
to enumerate the set X we would like it to be finite, and it is
infinite on two counts:
 the sets of users and nonces are infinite;
 m m:m m:m:m:m : : : .
But if we can somehow reduce the set X
0
to a finite
size, and restrict the priming operation so that the se-
quence X
0
;X
1
;X
2
; : : : converges to a finite set, then we will
be able to construct the limit set X in a finite number of op-
erations, and so establish in finite time whether a rank func-
tion exists.
This is what we set out to achieve in the next two sec-
tions.
3.4.1 A convergent formulation of priming
Let us define first what we mean by the fragments of a mes-
sage:
fr(a) = fag (a an atom)
fr(fmgk) = fr(m) [ fk; k 1; fmgkg
fr(m
1
: : :mn) = ffr(mi) j 1  i  ng [
fm
1
: : :mi j 1 < i  ng [
fmi : : :mn j 1  i < ng
(For this last case, the message should be fully expanded so
that n is as large as possible; that is, so that no mi can be
written in the form mi
1
:mi
2
.)
Let D be the set of all messages, including the initgo and
respdone messages, that could ever appear in a protocol run
if no agent (including the enemy) ever behaves dishonestly.
In other words, D is the set of all the messages that the de-
signer intended ever to appear in a protocol run.
Now consider the subset M0 of M which contains all
fragments of all messages in D. This subset is still infinite,
because we have an infinite number of atoms; but it does
not have the problem of arbitrarily large concatenations and
encryptions. If we could reduce the number of atoms to
finite, then M0 would be finite.
Now we note that, since T  M0, generating X \M0
would be sufficient to enable us to check whether 
0
is a
rank function. For we are required to check whether T\X =
;, and this is now equivalent to checking whether T \ X \
M
0
= ;.
But how can we enumerate this set? We write
Z
0
= X
0
Zn+1 = Zn0 \M0
and
Z =
1
[
i=0
Zi
and give the following result:
Theorem 3.4.1. Assuming that INIT  M0, we have
that
Z = X \M0
This is non-trivial: in the one case, we perform all the
primings and then take a finite subset, whereas in the other,
we restrict our attention to the finite subset after each prim-
ing.
The proof, which is here omitted but can be found in [3],
shows by induction that Zi = Xi \M0 for each i.
3.4.2 Reducing the size of U and N
At this point, we apply a subtle renaming to the agents and
nonces.
Agents A and B we will keep as A and B. To those
zero or more other users who are under effective control
of the enemy—that is, whose secret keys and nonces are
in INIT—we shall assign names C
0
, C
1
, : : : . (There
will usually be at least one of these, because we will wish
to allow the enemy to use his own identity on the net-
work as an honest agent.) To the remaining zero or more
users whose secret keys and nonces the enemy does not
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m N(m)
fC
3
:C
5
:NIC
3
;7
:NIC
3
;2
gpkc
2
fC
0
:C
1
:NIC
0
;0
:NIC
0
;1
gpkc
2
C
1
:D
0
:NID
4
;1
:C
5
:NID
3
;3
C
0
:D
0
:NID
1
;0
:C
1
:NID
2
;0
NIC
4
;1
:NIC
3
;2
:NRC
3
;6
:NIC
5
;4
NIC
0
;0
:NIC
1
;0
:NRC
1
;0
:NIC
2
;0
fA:NBgKsd
2
fA:NBgKsd
0
fC
1
gpkc
0
fC
0
gpkc
1
A:B:S A:B:S
Figure 1. The normal form of messages
initially know, we give names D
0
, D
1
, : : : . We rename
the nonce sets accordingly: C
3
will have nonces in N IC
3
(=
fNIC
3
;0
;NIC
3
;1
; : : : g) and N RC
3
.
We now give some definitions and results which will en-
able us to reduce the size of the network much further.
Definition 3.4.2. The normal form of a message m, writ-
ten N(m), is the message obtained by permuting the C-
indices (that is, the i in every Ci, NICi;j, NRCi;j, pkci, skci, Ksci)
within m so that all the C-indices appear in numerical order
(starting from zero), and similarly with the D-indices; and
then, for each k, permuting the indices of the nonces within
N
I
Ck (that is, the j in every NICk;j) so that these also appear in
numerical order, and similarly for N RCk , N
I
Dk and N
R
Dk .
The examples given in Figure 1 should make this clear.
For a set S, N(S) = fN(m) j m 2 Sg.
Definition 3.4.3. We define the relation  on M such
that m
1
 m
2
, N(m
1
) = N(m
2
). We write E(m) =
fv j m  vg.
Remark 3.4.4.  is an equivalence relation, and E(m) is the
equivalence class containing m.
Definition 3.4.5. If a set S  M contains only entire
equivalence classes—that is, whenever m 2 S and m  v
then v 2 S—then it will be said to be normal-closed.
Proposition 3.4.6. If S is normal-closed then whenever
S m and m  v we have S v.
Proof. We can think of the transition from m to N(m) as
being the result of applying a permutation of the C-indices,
and another permutation of the D-indices. This is also true
of the transition from N(v) to v; and since N(m) = N(v),
we have permutations of the two index sets taking m to v.
Since the generation rules and the operation of the pro-
tocol treat all users in exactly the same way, then we can
replace all elements of S with ones in the same equiva-
lence classes by applying the same permutations to these
elements—so that if all occurrences of Ci (including NICi;p,
NRCi;q, pkci, skci, Ksci) in m become Cj in v, then we con-
vert all Ci to Cj throughout S as well. S is normal-closed,
so these new elements will all be in S too, and we will
have S v.
Definition 3.4.7. The transition from v to N(v) is a permu-
tation of indices. We will write this permutation of indices
as v, so that N(v) = v(v).
The transition from N(v) to v is the inverse of this per-
mutation, and is written as v 1, so v 1(N(v)) = v.
For a set S and a permutation of indices , we write (S)
as a shorthand for f(m) j m 2 Sg.
Corollary 3.4.8. If S is normal-closed then so is S 0.
Proof. If m 2 S0 then m 2 S or S  m. But since S is
normal-closed, in the former case v 2 S and in the latter
case S  v. So, either way, v 2 S0. Hence S0 is normal-
closed.
Proposition 3.4.9. For any message m and permutation of
indices , we have (fr(m)) = fr((m))
Proof. The proof is by induction on the structure of m.
There are three cases to consider:
1. For the base case, if m is an atom then (fr(m)) =
(m) = fr((m)).
2. If m = fvgk then our inductive hypothesis is that the
proposition holds for v. But then
(fr(m)) = (fr(fvgk))
= (fr(v) [ ffvgk; k; k 1g)
= (fr(v)) [
f(fvgk); (k); (k 1)g
= fr((v)) [
ff(v)g
(k); (k); (k) 1g
= fr(f(v)g
(k))
= fr((fvgk))
= fr((m))
3. If m = m
1
: : :mn (fully expanded so that n is as large
as possible) then our inductive hypothesis is that the
proposition holds for each mi. We show that the propo-
sition holds for m by induction on n. When n = 1 the
result is trivial; and when it holds for all concatenations
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of length less than n then
(fr(m)) = (fr(m
1
: : :mn))
= (ffr(mi) j 1  i  ng [
fm
1
: : :mi j 1 < i  ng
fmi : : :mn j 1  i < ng)
= f(fr(mi)) j 1  i  ng [
f(m
1
: : :mi) j 1 < i  ng
f(mi : : :mn) j 1  i < ng)
= ffr((mi)) j 1  i  ng [
f(m
1
) : : : (mi) j 1 < i  ng
f(mi) : : : (mn) j 1  i < ng)
= fr((m
1
: : :mn))
= fr((m))
Thus, by induction on n, our result holds for all con-
catenations.
Since the proposition holds in all three cases above, we con-
clude that it is true for all m 2M.
Corollary 3.4.10. If S is normal-closed then so is fr(S).
Proof. We are required to show that whenever m 2 fr(S)
and m  v, we have v 2 fr(S).
If m 2 fr(S) then m 2 fr(z) for some z 2 S. So
m(m) 2 m(fr(z)), and by Proposition 3.4.9, m(m) 2
fr(m(z)).
If m  v, m(m) = N(m) = N(v) = v(v) and so
v(v) 2 fr(m(z)).
Now, reversing the above process, v 2 v 1(fr(m(z))).
Again, by Proposition 3.4.9, v 2 fr(v 1(m(z))).
But since v 1 and m are permutations of the indices,
v
 1
(m(z)) is in the same equivalence class as z, and by
the normal-closure of S we conclude that v 1(m(z)) 2 S.
Then fr(v 1(m(z)))  fr(S), and so v 2 fr(S).
Therefore, fr(S) is normal-closed.
Remark 3.4.11. We note that INIT is normal-closed. Recall
that it contains all public keys, all agent identities, and the
secret keys and nonces only of those agents under enemy
control.
Remark 3.4.12. So is M0 normal-closed. For M0 =
fr(D), and D is normal-closed as a consequence of As-
sumption 3.2.1. Corollary 3.4.10 tells us that fr(D) must
be normal-closed as well.
For any given protocol, M0 will have a finite number of
equivalence classes. For Assumption 3.2.2 tells us that the
messages transmitted in a protocol run are parameterised
only by agent identities and nonce choices; and the nor-
malisation process effectively reduces these to four agent
identities with just one initiating nonce and one responding
nonce each.
Corollary 3.4.13. Xi, and hence Zi, is normal-closed for
all i.
Proof. The proof is a simple induction on i. In the base
case, X
0
= INIT, which is normal-closed. And whenever Xi
is normal-closed, Xi+1 = Xi0 is normal-closed. So, by in-
duction, Xi is closed for all i. Zi = Xi \M0, which is the
intersection of two normal-closed sets; and so Zi is normal-
closed as well.
This has major consequences. Since all the Zi are
normal-closed, we can represent each set by just keeping
track of which equivalence classes are in the set. This gives
us a finite representation of Zi.
When we come to calculate Zi+1 from Zi, we can repre-
sent rules corresponding to S m (with S  Zi) by treating
it as if it were N(S)  N(m). Although it will not in gen-
eral be strictly true that N(S)  N(m) whenever S  m,
the normal closure of Zi will ensure that N(S)  Zi ) S 
Zi ) Zi  m ) Zi  N(m).
4 (Non-)completeness
The question will be asked: what if there is no rank func-
tion? We now have a sure way of constructing a suitable
rank function if there is one, and of proving non-existence
if there is not. But can we deduce anything about the secu-
rity of the system when no rank function exists?
There are, in fact, two questions involved here. We
should note that the rank function depends not only on the
protocol under consideration but also on the network on
which the protocol is to be run. Although we have con-
centrated here exclusively on an arbitrarily large network
with multiple concurrent runs (because, for most purposes,
we will want to reject a protocol that is not secure on this
network; and if a protocol is secure in this case then it will
be secure on any network), the statement of the central rank
function theorem in Section 2.4 does not specify a type or
size of network. We need to consider
1. whether the rank function theorem is complete in its
most general sense: do all secure combinations of pro-
tocols and networks have associated rank functions; or
can we find a protocol and a network such that, al-
though the protocol is secure when run on that net-
work, there is no rank function to demonstrate this?
2. whether the rank function theorem is complete in its
most useful sense: do all protocols which are secure on
an arbitrarily large network with multiple concurrent
runs have rank functions; or can we find a protocol
such that, although it is secure on this network, there
is no rank function to prove the fact?
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4.1 General completeness
The analysis of Section 3.2 does not show that if a proto-
col is secure running on a specific small network then it will
be secure on a large network. It only shows that if there is a
rank function for the protocol on the small network then the
protocol is secure on the large network (because the rank
function will apply to the large network as well). This gives
an obvious approach to attacking general completeness: if
we can construct a protocol which is secure on the small
network, but not on the large network, then there can be no
rank function for the protocol on the small network. If there
were, it would also apply to the large network, contradicting
the insecurity of the protocol on the large network.
Such a protocol is given below. Each user U has two pub-
lic keys pku
1
and pku
2
, corresponding to secret keys sku
1
and sku
2
. The protocol instructs the user to leak one of
these secret keys at the end of a run as initiator. One leaked
secret key is not enough to breach security, and, because the
protocol cannot contain nondeterministic choices, we can-
not have a second run in which the second secret key of the
same user is leaked. But we can construct the protocol so
that one leaked secret key from each of two users constitutes
a security flaw, by including a redundant message encrypted
under one public key of each user:
Message 1: A ! B : A
Message 2: B ! A : ffNB;A;Bgpka
1
gpkb
1
Message 3: B ! A : ffNB;A;Bgpka
1
gpka
2
Message 4: A ! B : NB; ska1
We then have an attack on the third run, after both A and B
have played initiator and consequently leaked one public
key each:
Message :1: A ! C : A
Message :2: C ! A : ffNC;A;Cgpka
1
gpkc
1
Message :3: C ! A : ffNC;A;Cgpka
1
gpka
2
Message :4: A ! C : NC; ska1
Message :1: B ! A : B
Message :2: A ! B : ffNA;B;Agpkb
1
gpka
1
Message :3: A ! B : ffNA;B;Agpkb
1
gpkb
2
Message :4: B ! A : NA; skb1
Message :1: I(A)! B : A
Message :2: B ! I(A) : ffNB;A;Bgpka
1
gpkb
1
Message :3: B ! I(A) : ffNB;A;Bgpka
1
gpka
2
Message :4: I(A)! B : NB; ska1
However, although this protocol is fatally flawed when
multiple runs are allowed, it must be secure for the small
system which only allows one occurrence of an honest agent
starting a protocol run as the initiator. For message :4 ever
to appear, the intruder will have to be able to get hold of
nonce NB from one of message :2 and message :3. He
will need either to hold ska
1
, and one of ska
2
and skb
1
, or
to persuade another agent to decrypt one of these messages
for him.
Honest agents only ever decrypt the third message of the
protocol, and will only do so if all the fields of the encryp-
tion are appropriately set—which is to say that only A will
decrypt it, and then only if he thinks he is communicating
with B. A message 2 cannot be passed off as a message 3,
because a message 3 is encrypted with two keys from the
same agent, and message 2 is not. The intruder cannot use A
as an oracle unless A really is trying to communicate with B,
in which case there is no deception.
So the intruder will have to have discovered the appro-
priate keys. He can never get his hands on ska
2
, since it is
never transmitted; and he can only get ska
1
and skb
1
when
both A and B have run the protocol as initiator. In other
words, there must be at least two honest attempts to run the
protocol as initiator before any attack can succeed. The pro-
tocol is, therefore, secure on the small system.
4.2 Completeness on a large network
This question is still open, and needs further consider-
ation. If the theorem is not complete in this sense, then it
will probably be on account of the fact that the rank func-
tion concept cannot distinguish between external choice and
interleaving: if a process can output either message m
1
or
message m
2
then we must have (m
1
) = (m
2
) = 1—
exactly as if the process could output both message m
1
and
message m
2
. But no counterexample has been constructed.
However, by following this procedure, much information
can be gained from the proof that there is no rank function.
A derivation of the final message results: one can see ex-
actly why the respdone message must have a rank of one. It
has always been a simple matter, in our experience, to turn
this derivation into an attack with each S ! m correspond-
ing to a part of a protocol run. We cannot say with certainty
that one will always be able to construct an attack from this
information—because, of course, this can only be true if the
theorem is complete on a large network!
5 Conclusion
Until now, it has not been feasible to automate protocol
analysis on an unbounded network. Analysis has been re-
stricted either to protocols running on small networks, or to
(at best) semi-automated proof techniques.
Lowe [7], Stoller [17], and Roscoe and Broadfoot [13]
have all published significant results on finding bounds on
the size of network that needs to be anaylsed in order to
prove security on an unbounded network.
However, Lowe’s result does not apply to, amongst oth-
ers, protocols that make use of temporary secrets; Stoller
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disallows nested encryptions; and Roscoe and Broadfoot re-
quire that each agent be engaged in at most one protocol run
at any given time. Our approach does not suffer from any
of these limitations.
In this paper, we have given a process which may be
used to verify an authentication protocol on an unbounded
network, and shown that it may be automated. We antici-
pate that this discovery will provide a way to avoid tedious
manual proofs of protocol correctness without compromis-
ing the generality of the proof.
An implementation of this process is in progress.
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